What does the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient with panel data really measure? A theoretical approach with the case of a monetary area by Mark Wynne
What does the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient with panel data
really measure? A theoretical approach with the case of a
monetary area 
Samuel Maveyraud-Tricoire
GRAPE - University of Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV
Abstract
We base theoretically the fact that the "saving retention coefficient" with panel data measures
the integration within a considered group of countries but also the integration between this
group and the rest of the world, by using different levels of transaction costs according to
whether the considered country belongs or not to a monetary union.
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The approach proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (hereafter FH) in 1980,
which is based on the correlation between domestic saving and domestic
investment, is frequently used for measuring economic integration. For that,
these studies consider that "with perfect world capital mobility, there should
be no relation between domestic saving and domestic investment: saving in
each country responds to the worldwide opportunities for investment while
investment in that country is ￿nanced by the worldwide pool of capital" (FH,
1980, p. 317).
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the saving-investment correlation seems
to vary according to the econometrical method. With time series, the "sav-
ing retention ratio"1 indicates in what extent the domestic investment of a
country doesn￿ t depend on its domestic saving. Following FH, it can be in-
terpreted as the measure of the integration between the country and the rest
of the world. With panel data (pooled data over time), and, by extension,
with cross section data, the meaning of the FH coe¢ cient appears to be more
complex than the one proposed by time series. Indeed, economic integration
within a group of countries but also integration between this group and the
rest of the world appear to be measured at the same time. For example,
the saving retention coe¢ cient is about equal to one for 16 OECD countries
during the period 1960-1974 (FH, 1980) and means, in a certain extent, that
there is segmentation within the group of 16 countries and/or between this
group and the rest of the world.
Thus, the FH coe¢ cient with panel data must be interpreted with caution
for measuring the integration within a group of countries. However, as the
degree of integration within a monetary area constitutes one of the criteria
necessary for judging its optimality (Kenen, 1969), numerous studies try to
measure the integration within the Euro area by using the saving-investment
correlations without explicitly considering the double interpretation of the
FH coe¢ cient with panel data (cf., inter alia, Kleinewefer Lehner (1998),
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002)). They obtain a saving retention ratio signi-
￿catively di⁄erent from 0 (even if this coe¢ cient is smaller than those usually
￿nd for other groups of countries) which, contrary to their intrepretations,
could mainly re￿ ect the imperfect integration between the Euro area and the
1the "saving retention ratio" is the estimated coe¢ cient ￿ resulting from the following
regression: I
Y = ￿ + ￿ S
Y + ￿; where I
Y is the rate of domestic investment and S
Y the rate
of domestic saving.
1rest of the world as, inside this area, ￿nancial costs, which are associated with
currency premia, have disappeared with the arrival of Euro and as PPP (or
LOOP) seem to prevail inside the Euro area due to decrease of transaction
costs in trade (Engel and Rogers (2004)).
In order to base theoretically the problem of using the FH coe¢ cient with
panel data for measuring the integration within an area, we consider a world
where there are transaction costs in trade of goods which are supposed to
vary between countries according to the membership of a monetary union.
This modelisation constitutes an extension to those of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2000) (hereafter OR) and of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) (hereafter BG).
It di⁄ers from the OR model in two ways: ￿rstly, by the fact that we ex-
amine the dispersion of saving and investment rates whereas OR observe
the consequences of transaction costs on the consumption level and secondly,
because in our framework, there are n goods and n countries while in the
OR framework, there are two goods (with very speci￿c properties)2 and two
countries. Contrary to the study of BG, our model takes into account two
groups of countries whereas BG consider only one group (Euro area). This
choice allows to introduce di⁄erent levels of transaction costs according to the
considered group. Moreover, the transaction costs considered in our model
can be more easily empirically evaluated than those proposed by BG. In ac-
cordance with studies, we consider that these costs are less important in the
Euro area than in the rest of the world.
Our presentation is as follows: First, we present the general framework of
the model, then we introduce transaction costs in international trade. Next,
we proceed to the simulation of the model. Finally, in a last section, we
conclude.
2 The general framework
We consider a group of n small countries which are endowed of a own single
good at the ￿rst period. Among them, m countries form a monetary union
(m < n). These countries are called the "Inside the Monetary Union" coun-
tries (hereafter IMU countries) whereas the others are called the "Outside
the Monetary Union" countries (hereafter OMU countries).
2One good can be exported and imported, the other can only be imported by the
domestic country.













where Cj is the level of consumption of the composite good by the represen-
tative agent of the country j, ck represents the level of consumption of the
good k and ￿ is the elasticity of substitution supposed to be constant among
goods (￿ > 0).















k is the price of the good k expressed in the currency of country j.
We consider two periods and a log utility function:
log(Ct) + log(Ct+1) (3)
The representative household maximises its consumption level of composite
good at period t and at period t + 1 and determines the optimal level of




















where i is the nominal interest rate the representative household has to face,
p
j
j is the price of the good j expressed in the currency of country j and Pj is




where Kj;t is the quantity of capital in the country j. A is positive parameter
and ￿ is the elasticity of output to capital (￿ < 1).
The level of investment is equal to:
Ij;t = Kj;t+1 ￿ Kj;t (6)
We consider that Kj;t is exogenous and that all the capital is used at the end
of the second period (Kj;t+2 = 0).
3As aggregate consumption is equal to aggregate production (Y ￿), we have:






Thus, the optimal rate of investment is equal to:





























where ￿j is the in￿ ation rate of domestic good and ￿ is the in￿ ation rate of
composite good.
We now introduce transaction costs in the trade of goods by di⁄erentiating
the IMU case from the other cases.
3 The incidence of transaction costs in the
goods market
We suppose that there are transaction costs in the trade of domestic goods.
Transaction costs re￿ ect the border e⁄ect and are in this way an aggregate
of the tari⁄ and nontari⁄ barriers, the transport costs, the preferences for
the national good and various other risks (OR, 2000); we suppose "iceberg"
transaction costs: When the local good is traded, a part ￿ (0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1) of it,
which constitutes the transaction costs, disappears before its incorporation
in the composite good.
Moreover, for simpli￿cation reasons, we suppose that the exchange rate
between countries is constant over time and is equal to one.
Two di⁄erent cases must be considered:
￿ Case 1: Trade inside the monetary union
When a country, which belongs to the monetary area, trades with an-
other country of the monetary union ((j;k) 2 [1;m]
2, with j 6= k), we
suppose that there are no transaction costs in the trade of goods. So,
4as these countries share the same currency, the price in the domestic







￿ Case 2: Other cases
When a country, which belongs to the monetary area, trades with a
country situated outside the area (j 2 [1;m] and k 2 [m + 1;n]; with
j 6= k) or when two countries, which don￿ t belong to the union, trade
together ((j;k) 2 [m + 1;n]
2 ; with j 6= k), the price in local currency









We suppose, with the aim of simpli￿cation, that the price of a good k is
equal to 1 in its currency3.
The consumption-based price index appears to be di⁄erent according to
the kind of country. For an IMU country (j = IMU 2 [1;m]) we have:
PIMU;t =
 







and for an OMU country (j = OMU 2 [m + 1;n]):
POMU;t =
 







By modifying the consumption-based price index of an IMU country, the
transactions costs in trade of goods have an impact on its investment and
saving rates.
We now propose a simulation with the aim of illustrating this result.
4 Simulation
To show how saving and investment rates of an IMU country are modi￿ed
by the transaction costs associated to the trade with OMU countries, we
3In particular, it implies that ￿j = 0:
5estimate in di⁄erent cases the level of saving and investment rates when the
transaction costs diminish along the two periods (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Investment and saving rates in function of changes in transaction
costs
Figure 2:
We consider three cases: the case of an IMU country, of an OMU country
and the case where there are no transaction costs in the trade of goods (case
called "no tc"). In this last case, we logically observe that the decrease of
transaction costs has no impact on the saving and investment rates. For
the IMU and OMU cases, a decrease of transaction costs implies a rise of
investment rate and a decrease of saving rate at period t 4: more precisely,
a decrease in transaction costs implies weaker changes in saving rates than
in investment rates and the variation of these rates is more important for an
OMU country than for an IMU country. Thus, there is "retention" of saving
in the IMU zone even with no transaction costs within the area, which can
4with m = 10; n = 50; k￿ = 0;1; Kt = 1;0459; A = 0;1, ￿ = 0;7; ￿ = 15; ￿t = 0;7:
6be explained by the transaction costs associated to the trade with OMU
countries.
5 Conclusion
Our model shows that for a country belonging to a zone where there are
no transaction costs, we can observe saving retention due to the trade with
countries situated outside this area. Thus, with panel data, the saving-
investment correlation appears to be an indicator of the integration within
an area and between this area and the rest of the world.
According to these results, the saving retention coe¢ cient obtained with
panel data should be interpreted with cautiousness. In particular, the degree
of integration within a monetary area cannot only be measured by the FH
coe¢ cient.
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